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The Common Agricultural Policy: The Future of the CAP and  
Why Real Reform Will Never Happen 
 






This paper sets out to examine the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union 
from its inception to present day
1. Specifically, this paper seeks to answer the following 
questions: (1) What long-term effects, if any, did the circumstances surrounding, and leading up 
to the formation of the CAP have; (2) What have internal and external responses been to the 
CAP; (3) How has the CAP responded to major events both internally (within the European 
Union), and externally (internationally); (4) What affect does the recently implemented Lisbon 
Treaty
2
In order to answer these questions this paper begins with the contention that the CAP is in 
fact the largest and strongest driving force of EU expansion. In support of this proposition, this 
paper first examines the circumstances and events leading to the creation of the CAP in the 
European Community. Second, this paper examines what long-term effects the circumstances 
surrounding the CAP’s inception have had on the policy, particularly calling attention to the 
disproportionate Franco-German CAP benefits. Third, the paper then examines how the CAP has 
responded to historical events that have had significant effects on the European community, 
particularly EU expansion, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and the recent worldwide 
economic crisis. Finally, this paper examines common criticisms of and conflicts surrounding the 
CAP, both internally and externally, and argues that CAP reform, at least within the current 
institutional framework of the European Union, can never truly occur. 








If there is one uniform fact about which most scholars of both the European Union (herein, EU) 
and history generally can agree, it is that World War II left Europe devastated
4. It is estimated 
that forty million souls died as a result of World War II
5
                                                            
    
♣ Miguel de la Rosa Jr., JD (2010) University of Miami, BA Pol. Sci. University of Chicago 
. Additionally, the War left major cities 
throughout the continent in ruin, agricultural production in shambles—generously estimated to be 
    
1 At the time of writing of this paper, in the Spring of 2010, the most up to date information on the CAP available 
from the EU is through calendar year 2009. See, European Commission –  Agriculture and Rural Development, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm.  
    
2 The Treaty of Lisbon, or the Reform Treaty was signed by the EU member states in December 2007, and entered 




    
3 Ginsberg, Roy H.. “The Outputs of EU Governmental Decisionmaking – Agriculture” Demystifying the European 
Union: THE ENDURING LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION, 254 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. 
    
4 For an in depth discussion on post World War II Europe See, McCormick, John. "Origins: The Postwar World." 
The European Union Politics and Policies. 37-58 4th ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2008.  
    




at half of its possible production capacity—and food was rationed throughout Europe
6
  Europe’s immediate postwar priorities were threefold. First was the question of how to 
respond to a new world order in which the primary protagonists were not the prestigious nations 
of Europe
. Denmark, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands suffered the most from German occupation, 
while Britain had seen most of its major cities and at least two-thirds of its wealth annihilated by 
the war.  
7, now devastated by hundreds of years of war, but the United State (herein, U.S.) and 
the Soviet Union (herein, U.S.S.R.) who divided Europe and entrenched themselves throughout 
the world as a precursor to the Cold War
8. Second and third were the corollary and parallel goals 
of simultaneously re-building Europe
9 while promoting and ensuring a lasting peace
10. It is these 
last two goals, which, to Europe’s benefit, happened to overlap with U.S. priorities in the world. 
So much so, in fact, that President Harry S. Truman argued in an address to the United States 
Congress in March of 1947 that “the world faced a choice between freedom and totalitarianism, 
and that it must be U.S. policy ‘to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressure
11.’” The Truman Doctrine, as it came to be known
12, 
formalized in U.S. policy that which economists from both Europe and the U.S. knew to be true 
prior to the end of the war: that the means to achieving a stable and prosperous Europe rest in 
economic stability
13
  While the Breton Woods Conference
. The Truman Doctrine simply stated that priorities of postwar Europe and 
U.S. foreign policy overlapped in that the United States had a vital interest in rebuilding an 
economically stable and peaceful Europe. 
14 saw the creation of three major institutions (the 
GATT
15, the IMF
16, and the World Bank) that still shape the global financial market today
17, it 
was the formation of three major European institutions that is both momentous, and conspicuous 
for our purposes. Namely, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (herein, 
ECSC), the European Economic Community (herein, EEC), and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (herein, Euratom) all were signs that Europe was not only moving towards ensuring a 
lasting peace (ECSC, and Euratom) by making war impossible, but also rebuilding Europe (EEC). 
Some scholars know this period of growth and integration as the “golden age” for Europe
18. But 
while the bulk of research of this period focuses on the formation of these institutions, the Treaty 
(or Treaties) of Rome
19
 
 (herein, Treaty of Rome), was responsible for the creation of the EEC, 
and Euratom, and also contained agreement by its signatories on the Common Agricultural Policy 
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7 Id., at 41. 
    
8 Id., at 47. 
    
9 Id., at 49. 
    
10 Id., at 42. 
    
11 Id., at 49. 
    
12 Id. 
    
13 Id., at 47. 
    
14 The 44 country postwar economic summit in Breton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A. 
    
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
    
16 International Monetary Fund 
    
17 Van Dormael, Amand. Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System. NY: Holmes and Meier, 1978. 
    
18 See, Eichengreen, Barry. The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond 198 Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. See also, McCormick, at 69-71. 
    
19 BBC NEWS | EUROPE| Q&A | Common Agricultural Policy available at: 










, ultimately leading to the formation of the EU.  As such understanding the 
CAP is best analyzed in three parts. It is important to first understand what the original purpose 
and intent of the CAP was. Second, it becomes important to not separate the “what” from the 
“why”, but  attempt to understand what motivated the creation of the CAP, or rather what 
European interests were served with the formation of the CAP. Third, and finally, one must 
examine what the CAP really is by examining it methodology of implementation, and the effects 
of implementation. 
The CAP – The What 
 
Sicco Mansholt, an agriculture commissioner, originally drafted the Common Agricultural Policy. 
However, the version in the Treaty of Rome is a diluted version of the original policy
21. Article 
39 of the Treaty of Rome officially and formally created the CAP, and its original stated goals 
and purposes were to increase agricultural productivity
22, to ensure fair living standards for the 
agricultural community
23, to  stabilize markets
24, to  ensure the availability of food
25,  and to 








There is a practical reason and a political reason for the creation of the CAP. The practical reason 
is more easily addressed: The devastation that plagued Europe after the World Wars and the wars 
pre-war years, such as during the Great Depression left Europeans coping with starvation, 
rationing, and memories of lifetimes plagued with food shortages. As such the most practical 
predicament facing Europeans at the time of the Treaty of Rome was not only how to ensure 
peace through institutional cooperation and integration, but also how to ensure food security. Put 
simply, the CAP was and is Europe’s answer to the “food problem” if had faced for centuries, i.e. 
how to be secure the ability to feed the people. 
  The political reason for the implementation of the CAP centered around Franco-German 
interests in duty-free access to markets. Specifically, France, the largest agricultural producer of 
the original Rome Treaty signatories, wanted duty-free access to the German agricultural 
market
28. Accordingly, West Germany, the largest industrial state of the original Rome Treaty 
signatories wanted duty-free access to the French industrial market
29
 
. Thus, what began as simple 
European food policy quickly evolved into a quid pro quo political trade compromise between the 
Franco-German center to European integration. 
                                                            
    
20 For purposes of this paper the “modern era” is the period following the end of World War II (1945) to the present.  
    
21 See, Pinder, John The European Community: The Building of a Union, 78-86 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991. See also, Urwin, Derek W. 132-135 The Community of Europe, 2nd ed.. London: Longman, 1995. 
    
22  Ginsberg, Roy H.. Demystifying the European Union: THE ENDURING LOGIC OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION, 254 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. 
    
23 See, fn. 19. 
    
24 Id. 
    
25 Ginsberg, at 254. 
    
26 Id. 
    
27 The bulk of the information presented in this section comes from: 
27 Ginsberg, Roy H.. “The Outputs of EU 
Governmental  Decisionmaking  –  Agriculture”  Demystifying the European Union: THE ENDURING LOGIC OF 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, 254-257 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. 
    
28 Id. 
    




The CAP – Implementation 
 
     Although welfare state policies have been peripheral to the EU’s policy agenda, 





  The original purpose of the CAP can be summarized as support and increase of farm 
income and production. In practice, however, what was originally intended by the EU to be mere 
food policy, and an attempt to create food security has, ultimately, become the most integrated 
and the most supranational of all EU policies and institutions.   
Generally, the CAP is a combination of direct subsidy payments by the EU to EU farmers 
for crops and land, combined with a” price support” system
31. The CAP has three main 
elements
32. First is that the EU, as part of the CAP imposes import tariffs on goods originating 
outside of the EU
33. Second, the EU, again, under the auspices of the CAP,  also provides 
agricultural export subsidies (herein, export subsidies) to farmers who export their goods to cover 
the difference between the actual prices and the costs of farming the goods in the EU vs. the price 
of the goods on the world market
34. Hence when an EU farmer’s products’ price is higher than 
the world price, and therefore not as competitive as it would or could be if offered at a lower 
price, the farmer can sell the good at the (lower) world market price, and have the difference 
between the price and the cost reimbursed by the EU. Third, the EU, through its “price supports” 
guarantees EU farmers a minimum price at which the EU will buy the farmers’ goods when the 
world market price falls below the EU “minimum price
35.” The EU then either stores the goods 
until prices rise and then tries to sell the goods on the market at that time, or it donates the surplus 
as aid
36
  The bureaucracy involved in formulating and executing CAP policies is enormous. The 
European Council (herein, Council), with the assistance of the Committee on Agriculture (herein, 
ECCA), sets overall farm policy, but the day-to-day operation of the CAP is left to the European 
Commission (herein, Commission)
. 
37. Further, the Commission drafts and enforces legislation that 
the Council of Agricultural Ministers (herein, CAM) enacts
38. Generally, CAM legislation deals 
to price supports or production quotas, but perhaps the most significant aspect in the enactment of 
this  legislation is that  the Council enacts CAP legislation only  on the basis of consensus
39. 
Additionally, because CAP spending is compulsory, the European Parliament (herein, EP) under 
its authority to consult the Council on areas of compulsory spending, may amend, but not veto, 
CAP legislation. Additional groups involved in the implementation of CAP legislation are interest 
groups, which are also consulted before CAP legislation is enacted. The process by which CAP 
policy is formulated and enacted is further discussed and analyzed below under “CAP Reform
40
Within the Commission there exists a subset of common market organizations
.”  
41
                                                            
    
30 Sbragia, Alberta, and Francesco Stolfi. "Key Policies." The European Union: How Does It Work? 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2008. 128. 
 (herein, 
CMOs) that do the actual “work” in the CAP, including implementation, administration, and 
    
31 La Política Agrícola Común en Detalle, 3, Comisión Europea Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural (undated). Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_es.pdf. Last visited 04-18-10 
    
32 Ginsberg, at 255. 
    
33 Id. 
    
34 Id. 
    
35 Id. 
    
36 Id. 
    
37 Id., at 254. 
    
38 Id. 
    
39 Id. 
    
40 See, p. 20, below. 
    




enactment of CAP policies. These CMOs exist in every farm sector covered by the CAP
42. Some 
of the agricultural goods encompassed by the CAP and CMOs include  i.a.
43: beef and beef 
products, dairy and dairy products, flax
44, fruits and vegetables, hemp, honey, olives and olive oil, 
potatoes, poultry, rice and sugar. Additionally, CMOs are responsible for
45
 
: (1) the elimination of 
intra-EU trade barriers, by creating common rules concerning free internal trade; (2) the actual 
creation of import levies and quotas; (3) competition, or antitrust rules; and (4) the dispersal of 
funds through the price support mechanisms discussed above. 
The CAP – By the Numbers 
 
Perhaps the only two things in the European Union that are larger than the bureaucracy that 
governs the CAP are the amount of controversy the CAP generates, and the amount of money the 
policy leads to expending each year. Prior to addressing the former, we must first dispose of the 
latter, which is admittedly an exaggeration, but only slightly so. The fact remains that from its 
inception until 2007, the CAP was the largest area of EU spending
46. From 1988 to 1992 the CAP 
comprised of 61% of the EU budget
47, down from its peak of 75% of the budget in 1970
48. As of 
2006, the CAP was responsible for 41% of spending in the EU budget
49, and it was not until 
2007, when the CAP dipped to its all time low of 33%, that the CAP ceased to be the largest 
single item in the EU budget
50. The 2009 data, however, indicate a sharp rise in CAP spending to 
40% of the EU budget
51. The EU projects that by 2013 CAP spending will be reduced to 32
52 - 
33%
53, at which time the CAP would again cease to be the single largest budgetary item in the 




The CAP – The Driving Force of Integration? 
 
“[W]hy did European states, traditionally jealous  of their independence, pool 
sovereignty in an international organization that increasingly acquired federal 
attributes? ... because it was in their best interest to do so…The [European Council] 




Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a theory expounded by Andrew Moravcsik in 1998, which 
claimed that national governments, and not supranational institutions controlled the pace and 
                                                            
    
42 Id. 
    
43 For the complete list of agricultural sectors encompassed in the cap, See, European Commission – Agriculture and  
Rural Development | Agriculture in the European Union - Statistical and Economic Information 2009. Available for 
download at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2009/table_en/index.htm. Last visited 04-18-10. 
    
44 Which is patently absurd. 
    
45 See, fn. 41. 
    
46 McCormick, at 300. 
    
47  EUROPA  –  Press Releases –  EU Buget –  Facts and Myths available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/350&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en. Last visited 04-18-10. 
    
48 McCormick, at Id. 
    
49 Sbragia, at 129. See, fn. 30. 
    
50 McCormick, at Id. 
    
51 European Commission – Agriculture and Rural Development | Europe's agriculture and the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) –  frequently asked questions | The cost of the CAP. 2009. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/faq/cost/index_en.htm. Last visited 04-18-10 
    
52 See, fn. 49, at Id. 
    
53 See, fn. 51. 
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55 Dinan, Desmond. “How Did We Get Here?” 22-41 The European Union: How Does It Work? 2nd ed. Oxford: 




scope of European integration
56. Moravcsik’s theory was an expansion of an earlier theory by 
Alan Milward, who argued that while economic interests compelled Western European countries 
to integrate, national governments shared sovereignty only to the extent necessary to resolve 
problems that would otherwise have undermined their legitimacy
57. This contrasts with Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, a theory of the Neofunctionalist school of Haas and Lindberg that had 
dominated early scholarly discussions on European integration
58. The Neofunctionalist school of 
European Integration  argued that the institutions themselves  take on a life of their own and 
became drivers of European Integration
59
         While Moravcsik and Milward’s theories are essentially complementary and compatible, 
they are often viewed to be irreconcilable with Neofunctionalism. However, it is the contention of 
this paper to suggest that not a single theory independently explains the CAP adequately. While 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism might explain why the CAP came into being, it fails to explain the 
modern embodiment of the CAP. Similarly, Neofunctionalism adequately explains the “life” of 
the CAP, but fails in its ability to adequately explain why the CAP came into being. Arguably, a 





” from the other three major institutions in existence when the Treaty of Rome was 
signed. However, this paper contends that the motivations behind the CAP with its size and 
significance throughout its “lifetime” disprove this approach. An in-depth analysis of the CAP 
only supports this argument, and leads us to the reasonable conclusion that the CAP was and 
continues to be a significant driving force in European Integration, with no single theory on 
European Integration adequately explaining the entirety (inception – present) of the CAP. 
The CAP – The Driving Force of Integration 
 
The CAP as the driving force of European Integration is best understood by analyzing three main 
points. First, by examining and considering the social and economic condition of Europe 
surrounding the formation of the CAP, one observes that the Liberal Intergovernmentalists have 
the strongest hold on this period of European Integration. Second, turning subsequently  to 
examining the long-term effects of the circumstances surrounding the inception of the CAP, what 
emerges to best explain the CAP is an amalgamation, or hybrid, between the two theories. Third, 
and finally, by considering the CAP from its inception through modern day
61 in its totality, what 
emerges in a theory sui generis  which combines Liberal Intergovernmentalism, 
Neofunctionalism, and Neoliberalism – which contends that Democracies have created a separate 




. The conclusion that the CAP is essentially a unique method of describing and 
driving European Integration is the framework within which this paper then further examines how 
the CAP has responded to global events, and what the likely chances of success are future CAP 
reform. 
Origins of the CAP 
 
We return once more to Europe prior to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, accepting two basics 
premises: First, it accepted that the CAP was originally meant to be the food policy for the 
                                                            
    
56 Id., at 23. 
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59 For an in depth analysis on the theories surrounding European Integration, See, McCormick, at 61-93. 
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61 Addressing questions (1) and (2), as set out in the syllabus.  
    
62 For an in depth analysis of Neoliberalism, See, Lipson, Charles. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made 




European Community (herein, EC), because EC member states had a practical interest in wanting 
to be able to feed their citizens at the present. Second, EC member states had an interest in being 
able to feed its citizens in the future, i.e. EC member states had a significant interest in ensuring 
food security. However, food security does not exist in a vacuum, but has political benefits: 
Firstly, similar to the creation of the ECSC, the pooling food resources, combined with ensuring 
that no country went hungry made war both less likely, even unnecessary. Food security promotes 
peace. Secondly, two main antagonists during  the centuries of European wars preceding the 
Treaty  of Rome—France and Germany—both had economic interests in this maintenance of 
peace.  
  As previously briefly mentioned, the Franco-German center to the EC had political and 
economic interests in having access to each other’s economies
63. From an economic standpoint 
France had an interest in getting access to German market because agriculture accounted for 12% 
of its Gross National Product (herein, GNP) and employed almost 25% of France’s workforce
64. 
However, because Germany was the stronger industrial power, and not necessarily anemic in its 
agricultural sector (with agriculture being 8% of GNP, and employing 15% of the population
65), 
France had legitimate concerns that a single-market system alone could become dominated by 
Germany. As such France’s interest in the CAP were certainly protectionist
66. One scholar went 
as far as to argue that the CAP’s protectionist tendencies were exacerbated by French President 
Charles de Gaulle, who viewed the CAP as a means of bringing German wealth to France, in 
exchange for more stable and reliable German access to French Agricultural products
67. In fact 
the infamous “Empty Chair Crisis” of the EU was caused in part by President DeGaulle seeking 
to preserve French interests and its inequitable, and superior benefits in the CAP
68
 
 for France. 
Applying theory to these facts, the Neofunctionalist’s deficit in relation to the CAP becomes 
apparent, as there is no Neofunctionalist’s explanation why the CAP should exist (only how it 
manifests after it came into existence. Thus Liberal Intergovernmentalist (herein, LI) theory best 
explains the inception of the CAP. 
CAP Growth (1970 – 2009) 
 
When the Empty Chair Crisis was resolved by the Luxembourg Compromise in 1967, the direct 
impact on the CAP was that by 1970 it would receive its own independent financial resources. 
Aside from this event (itself being one of the points of contention, which actually contributed to 
the empty chair crisis), it confirmed that a member states could assert the right to veto an EC 
proposal if a “vital (national) interest” was at stake
69. Essentially, the Luxembourg compromise 
had two effects: One, it allowed the CAP to take on an independent existence as an institution; 
and two, it elevated Agriculture to the level of a “vital” French interest. In this instance in 
applying facts to theory, neither the Neofunctionalists nor the Liberal Intergovernmentalists 
adequately explain the CAP growth in its entirety. Neofunctionalism explains the EC, as an 
entity, seeking to elevate its influence and independence, but not the Fresh reservation of rights 
on the ability to still exercise an enormous check on the CAP. Vice versa, LI, explains the latter, 
but not the former. Both LI and Neoliberalism together, however, explain the domestic opposition 
DeGaulle faced in France during the Empty Chair Crisis, and why the Luxembourg compromise 
was reached
70
                                                            
    
63 See, “The CAP – The Why”, supra, at 5. 
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           It  is this point that must give an  international relations scholar pause  because of its 
unprecedented nature. The Empty Chair Crisis was caused largely in part because of the CAP, 
which was an experiment in pooling sovereignty and resources. That should have been the end of 
the experiment then and there, but domestic opposition, and recognition of the importance of the 
CAP,  caused France to  seek an end the crisis: The people of a sovereign nation not only 
recognized that giving up an essential element of sovereignty was vital to their nation’s future 
interest; yet  they also embraced the idea,  and forced their sovereign to yield  some of its 
sovereignty. Applying these facts to theory, the only viable explanation of the existence of the 





Internal Criticisms of and Responses to the CAP 
 
The first area of controversy surrounding the CAP, and which is most easily addressed, is the 
criticism the CAP receives from within the EU. Internal (EU) controversies surrounding the CAP 
can be divided into two main areas. The first area is that the CAP disproportionately favors the 
larger EU member states, despite the fact that new EU members are more likely to, and in fact, 
often times do, have more agricultural based member states than the larger and older members
72. 
The second and related area of internal controversy surrounding the CAP is that the CAP still 
disproportionately favors older and larger member states than newer, smaller member states that 
need it more. France and Germany are two of the top three receipients of CAP funds in the EU 
today
73, with Spain tied with Germany as the 2nd largest receiver of CAP funds, and Greece (5th) 
especially reluctant to give up their CAP funds to newer member states, citing the fact that they 
still need those funds to support their agricultural sectors
74
  Third, the CAP is controversial because of its success. Because prices on agricultural 
goods are more likely to fluctuate than most other goods, the CAP’s price supports set food prices 
in the EU artificially high
.  
75, even during periods of surplus
76, which has resulted in Europeans 
spending about 25% of their incomes on food
77. Fourth the CAP is simultaneously internally and 
externally controversial because it still encompasses vital state interests in “the politics of food 
and in the policy’s redistribution of wealth
78,” both in regards to France





International Criticisms of and Responses to the CAP 
 
The largest and potentially most relevant external criticism of the CAP is that it is incredibly 
protectionist
81
                                                            
    
71  Again, because Neoliberalism argues Democracies don’t go to war with one another because of domestic 
accountability. 
 and prevents access to the European market by foreign farmers, especially United 
States (US) farmers. The CAP, in fact, was responsible for the breakdown of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Doha Round of talks in July 2006, because the US and the EU could not 
    
72 See, fn. 30, at 129. 
    
73 Id, at 131. 
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75 Ginsberg, at 255. 
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resolve their disputes surrounding the CAP
82. Attacks on EU disruptions of the world market 
because of the CAP have even gone as far as accusing the CAP of causing international trade 
wars, because EU export subsidies drive down world market prices or cause other farm exporting 
nations to subsidize their own exports
83. One think tank further argues that the CAP will continue 
to be a point of discord on trade between the US and the EU
84
 
, an issue to which this paper now 
turns. 
The CAP’s Response to EU Expansion  
 
At the time of the Treaty of Rome, agricultural industries employed approximately 25% of the 
European population
85. After the 1995 expansion of the EU, in what was known as the EU-15, 
that percentage dropped to less than 5%
86. The present EU-27 is estimated to employ twelve 
million farmers
87. But put into perspective
88, the percentage of people employed in agriculture in 
Europe today is less than 2.5% (~ 2.42%)
89. Yet despite this small percentage of the population 
actually employed in agriculture, rural areas cover over 90% of EU territory and are home to 
about half of the EU’s population
90. Additionally, prior to the global economic crisis, the EU was 
an economic powerhouse with EU agricultural exports worth $370 billion, and accounting for 
43% of the global total in 2005
91. Finally, this percentage of the population employed in 
agriculture is not uniform across the EU, and of the 12 most recent states to join the EU all have 
at least 10% of the population employed in agricultural sectors
92
 
. The significance of this point is 
examined in greater depth in the section titled “CAP Reform” below. 
Successes of the CAP 
 
Prior to addressing the final two points of this paper – (1) The CAP’s response to the global 
economic crisis; and (2) the future of CAP reform – this paper first seeks to address the successes 
of the CAP, and why they support this paper’s position that the CAP represents a leading driving 
force in European Integration. The CAP has succeeded in two extraordinary ways. First, it has 
enabled European food security by making Europe self-sufficient in the  areas of food and 
agriculture. The best example of this point is that the most reluctant member of the EU, Britain, 
which prior to World War II imported 70% of its food and food needs, today imports less than 
33% of its food and food needs
93
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. If anything, the CAP has been successful to a fault because of 
the resulting excess of goods, and international economic conflicts caused by it (as previously 
discussed) – though these conflicts CAP have resulted only in economic disputes. Yet the CAP 
has succeeded in creating food security in Europe. Second, the CAP has succeeded in promoting 
peace in Europe through the re-distribution of wealth and resources among its citizens. And while 
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Neofunctionalism explains why the CAP has become such a massive and powerful entity in the 
EU, and LI explains why the CAP was created, the two are not antithetical, and neither can 
independently explain why France chose to end the Empty Chair crisis when it had the potential 
on its own to be an agricultural hegemon in Europe. Only an amalgamation of LI, 
Neofunctionalism and Neoliberalism can explain the entirety of the CAP. Beyond that point this 
paper contends that the CAP is both a means and an ends unto itself simply because of its size 
and its representation of European norms and values. 
  In fact one of the “new roles” of the CAP is to aid the farming community in ensuring a 
certain amount of economic activity in every rural area and to protect the bio-diversity of the 
European countryside. The interest of protecting the “diversity” of the European countryside and 
the “recognition” of a “rural way of life—people living in harmony with the land”- are stated as 
an important aspect of Europe’s identity
94
 
. Additionally, with the expansion of the EU, CAP 
policies have moved away from supporting the production of goods to supporting rural 
development and environmental protection. Essentially, because the CAP has been so successful 
as an aspect of EU food policy, it has  transcended itself to become an embodiment of the 
European identity and a means of cultural adhesion as well. In support of this point, the following 
sections are presented. 
The CAP, Lisbon, and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The Lisbon treaty had one substantive effect on the CAP: It incorporated the Fisheries Policy of 
the EU into the CAP
95. Beyond that change, the European Commission only recently
96 
announced plans “to overhaul its agricultural policy in line with the EU's new long-term 
economic strategy
97.” This plan for CAP reform is discussed below. In announcing the proposed 
reforms, Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Cioloş said in his speech to the EP that “the current 
policy faces major challenges, including climate change, problems with food availability and 
pressures on resources and rural economies.” As the EU pursues further reform, commissioner 
Cioloş warned that the stakes are high: “The events that the world has experience in the last two 
years serve as a reminder of this
98
However, it is unclear what the experience of the last two years has shown Europe, 
because according to WTO 2009 data, Europe remains an agricultural exporting powerhouse, and 
of leading exporting nations (or groups) the EU saw the lowest drop (9%) in exports as a result of 
the global economic crisis
.”  
99. Taken in that light, the CAP is a resounding success because during 
a global crisis the EU saw: (1) an increase in the strength of its currency
100
 
; (2) it did not suffer 
from food shortages; and (3) of world export leaders saw the lowest decline in percentage of 
exports shipped. In what was arguably the greatest world catastrophe since World War II, the 
CAP did exactly as it was designed to and helped Europe stay (mostly) above the economic crisis.  
CAP Reform 
 
Understanding the significance of the CAP in keeping Europe profitable despite the  global 
economic crisis leads the conclusion that CAP “Reform” might not result in any real reform. 
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Instead, CAP reform will likely not address the criticisms of the CAP, but only serve to increase 
its significance and prominence. In support of this proposition this paper offers three main 
contentions. First that the recent success of the CAP through the economic crisis will not lead to 
any changes in the CAP that will truly address external criticisms, and only moderately address 
internal criticisms. Second, this paper argues that the current bureaucracy that governs and 
implements the CAP makes true reform difficult. Finally, this paper argues that the recent success 
of the CAP only lends it credibility and public support, which might mean CAP expansion, rather 
than reform.   
The first point reiterate the previous section: Because the CAP accomplished exactly 
what it was intended to, and saw only minimal effects on EU agriculture and agriculture exports, 
it is unclear why the global economic crisis would warrant the EU to “reform” the CAP. A 9% 
drop in  EU agricultural exports was nowhere nearly  as catastrophic as it could have been. 
Consider the 9% decline seen by the EU, in contrast to the 23% decline seen by the US, or the 
16% decline seen by Singapore
101 (the only country that saw an increase in exports was Hong 
Kong, at 2%, and they were not exclusively agricultural exports
102
The second reason the CAP will not likely see real reform has to do with the organization 
of the bureaucracy involved in the CAP. Specifically, the de facto  means by which CAP 
implements legislation involves consultation with lobbyist groups that represent farmers
). These facts taken together 
lead to the  reasonable conclusion that the CAP worked, though  it is now a goal of the 
Commission to make it work better. To accomplish this, and perhaps for the CAP to serve as a 
stronger buffer in the next global crisis, would be to achieve to reverse the drop in agricultural 
exports - the only likely “reform” the CAP would then see is expansion and growth.  
103. In no 
other country with perhaps the exception of Japan, does a lobby actually have such significant 
role in the implementation of regulations over the industry  which they represent. Given the 
prominence of agriculture in EU wealth, it is unlikely there is any lobby in the world as powerful 
as COPA, or the other agricultural lobbies in the EU. The strength of the lobby is only augmented 
when one considers two major factors. First, the twelve newest EU memberstates all have at least 
10% of their populations working in agriculture, disproportionate to the rest of the EU (and as 
high as 19% in Poland and 22% in Romania
104). No real reform can take place where the lobby of 
one group plays such a prominent role influencing regulations for that group (and considering that 
French domestic policy is still dominated by agriculture, both as a lobby and an economic force, 
and as part of the French psyche). France still accounts for more than 20% of agricultural 
production in the EU-15
105 
106. Additionally, French voters are reluctant to vote in favor of what 
they perceive to be anti-agriculture policies
107, a fact not likely to change in the near future in 
light of recent CAP success
108
Finally, and in summary, this paper argues and concludes that the recent CAP success 
will likely lead only to CAP expansion, and not reform, least of all reforms that address 
international criticisms of the CAP. First, consider that a recent survey of EU citizens showed that 
60% of the population currently supports, or would like to see an increase in CAP spending
. Despite the Post-Lisbon Treaty move to ensure more qualified 
majority voting (herein, QMV) in the EU, the one area which QMV is presently not slated to 
affect, is the CAP. Even if that were to change, it is unlikely the CAP will decrease in any 
significant amount because the EU landscape is still dominated by agricultural interests. 
109
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and this despite the fact that the CAP provides for less than 5% of jobs for the total European 
population. This figure is particularly important when one considers the democratic deficit of the 
CAP, because the CAP is the only institution over which the EP cannot really implement policy 
or reform, removing it from any real public accountability
110
Considering the fact that the CAP works, and works well - so much so that U.S. President 
Barack Obama in his economic stimulus plan for the U.S. in response to the global economic 
crisis, included a “Buy American
.  
111” protectionist provision, similar to the CAP - resulting in EU 
threats to only further subsidize EU industries through the CAP
112. Taken together, the only 
likely and reasonable future for the CAP is expansion - and continued criticism internationally 
and domestically. But if Neoliberalists are correct, and democracies will continue to create a 
sustained peace, then the CAP will only continue to grow, and it is likely that the EU would 
prefer a second chicken war
113
 
 than the loss of food security. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper argued that the CAP was and will continue to be  the driving force in European 
integration for three main reasons. First, no existing theoretical framework can independently, 
and adequately explain European integration, but satisfies several theoretical paradigms to 
explain its relevance. Secondly the CAP is an embodiment of the European identity, as well as a 
crucial component to the “completion” of Europe—a stated goal of the EU. Thirdly, the CAP 
works, and works so well that its only logical “destiny” is expansion to continue assurance of 
economic stability and food security in Europe. 
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